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Abstract  
This paper proposes a viable IT-based solution for ensuring 
the privacy and security of sensitive information in contempo-
rary Health Information Systems (HIS). 
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Introduction    
In today's society Information, Computer and Telecommuni-
cations technologies (ICT) are increasingly entrenched as in-
formation infrastructures for the majority of essential services 
in leading countries such as Australia, the UK and the USA.  
ICTs are being designed and deployed to process, transmit 
and store health information in various e-health systems glob-
ally.  These systems play a significant role in the potential 
improvement of quality and productivity in the health sector. 
In order to manage healthcare stakeholders' expectations of 
these systems, governments have initiated e-health blueprints 
which provide guidelines to the developers of HIS.  These 
guidelines take into account the interests of all stakeholders in 
the health sector.   
This paper is particularly interested in the implementation of 
HIS from an information security aspect: the protection of 
personal privacy and security of electronic patient records.  
Current approaches to information security in HIS are, in the 
opinion of the authors, not sustainable. This paper proposes a 
viable ICT solution which can reliably provide appropriate 
levels of secure access control for the protection of sensitive 
health data in HIS.   
Access Control in ICT 
Access control is one of the fundamental security mechanisms 
used to protect computer resources; in particular in multi-user 
and resource-sharing computer environments such as contem-
porary HIS.  The lack of adequate access control management 
in such systems has been demonstrated on numerous occa-
sions in recent history: the privacy invasion scandal at Austra-
lia's Centrelink [1], the lack of adequate safeguards in the UK 
NHS patient records system [2], and the significant IT secu-
rity weaknesses identified in the USA HHS information sys-
tem [3].  These types of breaches have the potential for inflict-
ing, and do inflict, major harm on consumers and providers 
alike.  The issue of providing suitable access control in such 
systems is not an insurmountable one.  This paper proposes a 
viable solution to this issue. 
The two traditional types of access control modes are Discre-
tionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control: 
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) mechanism allows 
the owner of information to grant access permissions to other 
users or programs at his/her discretion without the system 
administrator’s knowledge.  Such a policy does not provide 
the actual 'owner' of the system fully centralised access con-
trol over the organisational resources.  DAC mechanisms are 
fundamentally inadequate for strong system security because 
the owner of the system does not have access control over the 
objects (files) on the system. 
The Mandatory Access Control (MAC) mechanism pro-
vides the ability to limit access to only legitimate users.  Fer-
raiolo et al [4]  underscore that MAC is necessary when the 
provision of a truly secure system is required.  Access permis-
sion to information is determined by the user’s security clear-
ance compared to the security level of information determined 
by the system.  This is also known as a multi-level security 
(MLS) policy, which was first introduced by Bell and LaPa-
dula (BLP) [5] .   
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is complementary to 
both DAC and MAC techniques. RBAC enables easier man-
agement by ensuring finer granularity in the access system.  
The majority of current information systems which manage 
access control are DAC-based allowing for wide implementa-
tion of commodity software and hardware.   Examples are 
Microsoft Corporation’s Windows systems, open-source sys-
tems such as Linux and the original Unix system.  These are 
general-purpose systems intended for use in as many applica-
tions as possible.  In the healthcare sector, HIS MAC-based 
systems are more appropriate to, and capable of, satisfying the 
specific requirements of privacy and security of information.   
In technical computing terms an application program resides 
atop a number of sub-systems, one of which is the operating 
system (OS) which effectively controls what the hardware 
does.  The security of an application program is restricted by 
the strength of the security that the OS allows.  DAC and 
MAC mechanisms are enabled at the OS level as well as 
higher levels including data network management and the 
database management systems for the application. 
Our Approach  
ICT is now sufficiently advanced that a MAC-based elec-
tronic healthcare management system is feasible.  Our re-
search to date has indicated that current OS structures need to 
be updated for HIS needs.  The Health Informatics Access 
Control (HIAC) model is our approach to overcoming many 
of the privacy and security issues which have plagued previ-
ous attempts at electronic health management systems.  The 
HIAC is based on the MAC type of OS which primarily satis-
fies the requirement for confidentiality of records (this is a 
major impediment in current and previous systems).  The HIS 
is then developed atop the trusted OS.  
For general applications, currently available products that 
support the MAC principles of trusted OS include “Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux (RHEL) Version 5, “Fedora Core 6”, and 
“Sun Microsystems Solaris 10 with Trusted Extensions Soft-
ware”.  The HIAC model exploits the privacy- and security-
enhancement features of such trusted OS in the healthcare 
environment.  The end result is a dedicated trusted HIS which 
satisfies all privacy and security requirements.   
To determine the practical viability of a HIAC model for HIS 
a demonstrator, based on the Security Enhanced Linux 
(SELinux) OS with MAC and RBAC approach, was built [6]  
The HIAC model is necessarily MAC-based accompanied by 
RBAC properties for flexibility and a refined level of granu-
larity.  This degree of simultaneous control and flexibility is 
not achievable with DAC, RBAC or MAC individually.   
The MAC-based system can provide the ability to limit access 
to only legitimate authorised users.  In general, the organisa-
tional security policies can be defined by the CEO/CIO. Ac-
cess privileges are determined by the data custodians.  The 
HIAC profiling mechanism allows for the system administra-
tor to configure the organisational access policies defined and 
determined by the CEO/CIO and the data custodian.  With 
MAC the access privileges of all users are equally bound by 
the policy, not set by the discretion of the file/program owners 
as with DAC.  The internal adversary or disgruntled employee 
will not be able to access health information inappropriately 
or even through feeding information to an external adversary.   
The MAC mechanism can protect the system from malicious 
or flawed applications which can potentially damage or de-
stroy the system and its information.  This can prevent an ex-
ternal adversary penetrating the system by exploiting Trojan 
Horse attacks, viruses, malware, social engineering or other 
illicit means to gain total access control or to tamper with au-
dit systems.  The HIAC model includes the principle of least 
privilege and also enforces domain separation through the use 
of the protected zones known as ‘sandboxes’ within Redhat’s 
SELinux.  These help prevent applications interfering with 
each other such that an unauthorised user cannot gain overall 
control of the system as with DAC.   
HIAC incorporates RBAC which complements contemporary 
MAC systems by ensuring more flexibility over the more tra-
ditional MAC standalone systems. With RBAC Doctor X and 
Nurse Y are appointed into a role-type, for example Doctors 
and Nurses respectively.  Access permissions are associated 
with these roles.  In practice this approach gives more flexibil-
ity than in the traditional MAC where accesses are granted to 
individual persons. 
In general HIAC provides for maximum flexibility within a 
strongly secure environment.  This means achieving a balance 
between security needs and flexibility of implementation, 
which is primarily determined from a privacy risk assessment.  
For example HIAC provides the flexibility of having an emer-
gency override function by switching to the emergency policy 
in emergency circumstances.  Full auditing of the system de-
ters potential abuses of this flexibility. 
Conclusion 
Current moves toward Web-based identity and authentication 
structures present major challenges where such structures are 
not based on highly trusted OS.  The majority of OS in use 
today are DAC-based in which there are no inherent privacy 
and security features.  All applications and supporting soft-
ware which necessarily reside atop these untrusted operating 
systems are also untrusted and therefore vulnerable from a 
privacy and security viewpoint.  
This paper contends that it is both timely and desirable to 
move electronic HIS towards privacy- and security-aware 
applications that reside atop trusted computing-based OS.  
Such systems have the real-world potential to satisfy all stake-
holder requirements including modern information structures, 
organizational policies, legislative and regulatory require-
ments for both healthcare providers and healthcare consumers 
(privacy and security), and flexible operational demands in 
HIS. 
This paper emphasises the need for well-directed research into 
the application of inherent privacy- and security-enhanced 
operating systems to provide viable, real-world trusted HIS.  
The authors propose an HIAC model which has the potential 
to fulfil these requirements.   
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